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SOVEREIGN LITIGANTS: NATIVE AMERICAN NATIONS IN COURT
CATHERINE T. STRUVE*
I. INTRODUCTION
THE topic of this symposium—“Sovereignty’s Seductions: ReconcilingConflicting Claims to Govern”—invited participants to discuss a wide
array of attributes of sovereignty.  I chose as my topic the sovereignty of
Native American nations.  As is well known, Native American tribes pre-
existed both the state and federal governments.  The federal government,
however, has asserted authority over the tribes and has acted to limit tribal
authority in a number of ways.  Tribes retain governmental authority over
their members, but their criminal and civil authority over nonmembers
has been significantly curtailed over the past three decades.  Tribes do,
however, retain relatively intact another traditional attribute of sover-
eignty—sovereign immunity.  I have argued elsewhere that tribes can use
their immunity as a forum choice mechanism—choosing to provide re-
dress for valid claims but requiring those claims to be litigated in tribal
court.1
In this Article, I will consider another attribute of sovereignty: the
ability of tribes—and other governments—to sue in their own courts.  As I
note in Part II, it is ordinarily uncontroversial that a government may sue
in its own courts, and such suits are recognized as serving important gov-
ernmental interests.  But, as I explain in Part III, that ordinary assumption
fails to capture the realities of litigation for tribal plaintiffs.
Native American nations are sovereigns, but federal law views them as
subject to the power of the federal government.2  This has long meant that
* Professor, University of Pennsylvania Law School.  I thank the participants
in the Villanova Law Review’s Norman J. Shachoy Symposium for an enlightening
and thought-provoking discussion, Ann Juliano and Patrick Brennan for
organizing the symposium, and Frank Goodman for helpful comments on a draft.
1. See Catherine T. Struve, Tribal Immunity and Tribal Courts, 36 ARIZ. ST. L. J.
137, 177 (2004).
2. This view is doctrinally well-established but often criticized. See, e.g., Robert
N. Clinton, Tribal Courts and the Federal Union, 26 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 841, 845
(1990) (“The tribes never formally consented to become part of the Union, and,
therefore, the legitimacy of the exercise of federal and state authority over them is
frequently questioned.”); Nell Jessup Newton, Federal Power Over Indians: Its Sources,
Scope and Limitations, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 195, 196 (1984) (“The judiciary’s frequent
invocation of federal plenary power over Indian affairs is curious since the Consti-
tution does not explicitly grant the federal government a general power to regu-
late Indian affairs.”); Judith Resnik, Dependent Sovereigns: Indian Tribes, States, and
the Federal Courts, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 671, 696 (1989) (“Instead of the expected (if
complex) references to consent and to a federal government of limited powers,
other, often unspoken rationales—conquest, violence, force—are the primary
sources of the power exercised by the federal government over Indian tribes.”).
(929)
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tribal government powers were seen as limited not only by treaties be-
tween the relevant tribe and the federal government, but also by federal
statutes.3  In addition, federal doctrine held that tribes no longer pos-
sessed certain powers that were deemed inconsistent with their status (in
federal law) as “domestic dependant nations.”4  Until the late twentieth
century, this third sort of limitation on tribal power covered only a few
areas, such as the tribe’s ability to convey title to land without federal per-
mission5 or to conduct international relations.6  Within the past thirty
years, however, the United States Supreme Court has created a striking
range of federal common law limitations on tribal authority.  Part III sum-
marizes those limitations, which currently bar tribes from criminally prose-
cuting non-Indians and which often bar tribes from exercising regulatory
or civil adjudicative jurisdiction over nonmembers.
Commentators have already discussed in detail the conceptual flaws
and practical problems associated with current doctrine.7  I focus here on
a particular aspect of the doctrine’s effects—namely, the implications for
3. Thus, as late as 1982, the standard treatise on federal Indian law described
the framework as follows:
(1) an Indian tribe possesses in the first instance, all the powers of any
sovereign state; (2) conquest renders the tribe subject to the legislative
power of the United States and . . . terminates the external powers of
sovereignty of the tribe, for example, its power to enter into treaties with
foreign nations . . . ; (3) [the tribe’s remaining] powers are subject to
qualification by treaties and by express legislation of Congress.
FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 241-42 (Lexis Law Pub. 1982)
(1945).
4. For the origin of this phrase, see Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 17
(1831) (“[I]t may well be doubted whether those tribes which reside within the
acknowledged boundaries of the United States can, with strict accuracy, be denom-
inated foreign nations.  They may, more correctly, perhaps, be denominated do-
mestic dependent nations.”).
5. In 1823 the Supreme Court had formulated the “doctrine of discovery” in
the following terms: Indian tribes, the Court stated,
were admitted to be the rightful occupants of the soil, with a legal as well
as just claim to retain possession of it, and to use it according to their own
discretion; but their rights to complete sovereignty, as independent na-
tions, were necessarily diminished, and their power to dispose of the soil
at their own will, to whomsoever they pleased, was denied by the original
fundamental principle, that discovery gave exclusive title to those who
made it.
Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. 543, 574 (1823).
6. In Cherokee Nation, Chief Justice Marshall stated:
They [the Indian tribes] and their country are considered by foreign na-
tions, as well as by ourselves, as being so completely under the sovereignty
and dominion of the United States, that any attempt to acquire their
lands, or to form a political connexion with them, would be considered
by all as an invasion of our territory, and an act of hostility.
30 U.S. at 17-18.
7. See, e.g., Philip P. Frickey, A Common Law for Our Age of Colonialism: The
Judicial Divestiture of Indian Tribal Authority over Nonmembers, 109 YALE L.J. 1, 79
(1999) (critiquing cases in which “the Court has fallen victim to a ‘dormant ple-
nary power impulse’ to bring constitutional values to Indian country”).
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the tribe’s ability to litigate as a plaintiff.  The limitations on tribal author-
ity summarized in Part III ensure that much of the litigation that a tribe
may wish to bring against nonmembers must now proceed in non-tribal
court.  To some extent, a tribe may be able to pursue its sovereign interests
in protecting the welfare of tribe members by suing in non-tribal court
under non-tribal law.  Such a choice is a second-best option—from the
tribe’s perspective—compared to the standard ability of most sovereigns
to vindicate their interests in their own courts.  In Part IV, I consider the
fact that such a choice carries an additional implication for the tribe: a
defendant may attempt to counterclaim against the tribe on the theory
that the tribe’s decision to sue waived its sovereign immunity with respect
to the counterclaim.
This Article, accordingly, points out a link between the scope of a
tribe’s affirmative authority to govern and a tribe’s negative right to be
free from unconsented suit: the limits on the former sort of authority may
force a tribe to assert claims in non-tribal courts where defendants may
contend that the suit waives the tribe’s immunity from the defendant’s
claims against the tribe.  Part IV contends that if such a waiver is found, it
ordinarily should be limited to claims that arise from the same transaction
as the tribe’s claim and that operate only to reduce the tribe’s recovery (as
opposed to establishing an affirmative liability on the part of the tribe).
Such an approach accords with the treatment of claims brought by the
federal government, though it is more restrictive than the approach taken
with respect to claims brought by foreign nations or (sometimes) than the
approach taken with respect to claims brought by states.
II. SOVEREIGN LITIGANTS
It is commonly accepted that one of the attributes of sovereignty is
the power to create courts and to use them.  A sovereign may sue in its
own courts to enforce its law—both through criminal prosecutions and
through civil suits.  Such suits may vindicate the public interest8 or protect
the sovereign’s proprietary interests.9
The assumption that such suits are a basic governmental prerogative
finds expression, as to the federal government, in the grant of jurisdiction
to the federal courts over suits brought by the United States.  Article III
provides that the federal judicial power “shall extend . . . to Controversies
8. See, e.g., In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564, 584 (1895) (“Every government, intrusted
by the very terms of its being with powers and duties to be exercised and dis-
charged for the general welfare, has a right to apply to its own courts for any
proper assistance in the exercise of the one and the discharge of the other.”),
overruled on other grounds by Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 208 (1968).
9. See, e.g., Cotton v. United States, 52 U.S. 229, 231 (1850) (“Every sovereign
State is of necessity a body politic, or artificial person, and as such capable of mak-
ing contracts and holding property, both real and personal. . . .  [A]s a corporation
or body politic [the United States] may bring suits to enforce their contracts and
protect their property, in the State courts, or in their own tribunals administering
the same laws.”).
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to which the United States shall be a Party.”10  In The Federalist No. 80,
Hamilton thought this grant so obviously appropriate that he treated it in
three sentences: “Still less need be said in regard to [this grant of jurisdic-
tion].  Controversies between the nation and its members or citizens, can
only be properly referred to the national tribunals.  Any other plan would
be contrary to reason, to precedent, and to decorum.”11  Justice Story pro-
vided a lengthier explanation along the same lines in his Commentaries on
the Constitution:
It seems scarcely possible to raise a reasonable doubt, as to the
propriety of giving to the national courts jurisdiction of cases, in
which the United States are a party.  It would be a perfect novelty
in the history of national jurisprudence, as well as of public law,
that a sovereign had no authority to sue in his own courts. . . .  A
sovereign, without the means of enforcing civil rights, or compel-
ling the performance, either civilly or criminally, of public duties
on the part of the citizens, would be a most extraordinary
anomaly.12
The first Congress under the Constitution promptly made use of this
Article III power, granting the lower federal courts jurisdiction over fed-
eral criminal prosecutions13 and over civil suits by the United States for
amounts of $100 or more.14  Today, a general statutory grant provides that
“[e]xcept as otherwise provided by Act of Congress, the district courts
shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions, suits or proceedings com-
menced by the United States, or by any agency or officer thereof expressly
authorized to sue by Act of Congress.”15
10. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
11. THE FEDERALIST NO. 80 (Alexander Hamilton).
12. JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES; WITH A PRELIMINARY REVIEW OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE COL-
ONIES AND STATES, BEFORE THE ADOPTION OF THE CONSTITUTION 620-21 (1833).
13. See Act of September 24, 1789, § 9, 1 Stat. 73, 76-77 (granting federal dis-
trict courts jurisdiction—exclusive of state courts—over crimes cognizable under
federal authority, committed within the relevant district or on the high seas, where
penalty fell below certain specified limits); id. § 11, 1 Stat. 78-79 (granting federal
circuit courts exclusive jurisdiction—except where provided otherwise in First Judi-
ciary Act or other federal law—of all crimes cognizable under federal authority).
14. See id. § 9, 1 Stat. 77 (granting federal district courts jurisdiction over suits
by United States where “the matter in dispute amounts, exclusive of costs,” is
$100); id. § 11, 1 Stat. 78 (granting federal circuit courts jurisdiction over civil suits
by United States “where the matter in dispute exceeds, exclusive of costs,” exceeds
$500).  At that time, the Supreme Court had exclusive jurisdiction over suits by the
United States against a state. See id. § 13, 1 Stat. 80.  Today, the relevant statute
provides that “[t]he Supreme Court shall have original but not exclusive jurisdic-
tion of . . . [a]ll controversies between the United States and a State.”  28 U.S.C.
§ 1251(b)(2) (2006).
15. 28 U.S.C. § 1345 (2006). See, e.g., United States v. Lahey Clinic Hosp.,
Inc., 399 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 2005) (“Section 1345 creates subject matter jurisdic-
tion, and the statute can only be limited, as the initial proviso provides, by (1) an
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It is, likewise, a standard notion in the federal system that state gov-
ernments may bring criminal prosecutions and civil suits in their own
courts.  “The right to formulate and enforce penal sanctions is an impor-
tant aspect of the sovereignty retained by the States.”16  Thus, explaining
why the federal courts ordinarily will not enjoin pending state criminal
prosecutions, the Court in Younger v. Harris17 noted the principle “that
courts of equity should not act, and particularly should not act to restrain
a criminal prosecution, when the moving party has an adequate remedy at
law and will not suffer irreparable injury if denied equitable relief,” but it
stressed
an even more vital consideration, the notion of “comity,” that is,
a proper respect for state functions, a recognition of the fact that
the entire country is made up of a Union of separate state gov-
ernments, and a continuance of the belief that the National Gov-
ernment will fare best if the States and their institutions are left
free to perform their separate functions in their separate ways.18
That respect for state criminal prosecutions—coupled with recognition of
the inconvenience that a state prosecutor would face if forced to maintain
a state criminal prosecution in a federal court—also contributed to the
Court’s conclusion in Mesa v. California19 that the federal officer removal
statute permits removal only when the federal officer defendant asserts a
federal-law defense.20
States’ rights to bring civil suits in their own courts are also well-recog-
nized and protected.  As one example, in applying Younger abstention to
civil enforcement suits by states, the Court has recognized states’ interest
in pursuing civil remedies in their own courts.21  And even when a state
asserts a claim created by federal law, the state ordinarily may bring that
explicit repeal of the statute by an Act of Congress or (2) an implicit repeal by total
irreconcilability of the two acts.”).
16. Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 47 (1986).
17. 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
18. Id. at 44.
19. 489 U.S. 121 (1989).
20. Id. at 138 (reasoning that it would contravene strong policy against fed-
eral interference with state prosecutions “to permit removal of state criminal pros-
ecutions of federal officers and thereby impose potentially extraordinary burdens
on the States when absolutely no federal question is even at issue in such
prosecutions”).
21. See Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434, 444 (1977) (“The state action was
a suit by the State to recover from appellees welfare payments that allegedly had
been fraudulently obtained. . . .  [T]he principles of Younger . . . are broad enough
to apply to interference by a federal court with an ongoing civil enforcement ac-
tion such as this, brought by the State in its sovereign capacity.”); see also Huffman
v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 604 (1975) (“[W]e deal here with a state proceeding
which in important respects is more akin to a criminal prosecution than are most
civil cases.  The State is a party to the Court of Common Pleas proceeding, and the
proceeding is both in aid of and closely related to criminal statutes which prohibit
the dissemination of obscene materials.  Thus, an offense to the State’s interest in
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claim in its own courts because the state courts have concurrent jurisdic-
tion to hear federal claims unless state-court jurisdiction is excluded “by
an explicit statutory directive, by unmistakable implication from legislative
history, or by a clear incompatibility between state-court jurisdiction and
federal interests.”22  Admittedly, the defendant in a state-court federal
question suit might remove the case to federal court,23 but if the defen-
dant failed to do so then the suit would proceed in state court.
What, then, of tribal litigants’ prerogative to bring suit in tribal
courts?  As I discuss in the part that follows, federal doctrines significantly
limit the range of situations in which a tribe may sue in its own courts.
III. TRIBAL SUITS IN TRIBAL COURTS
It has long been a principle of federal Indian law that Native Ameri-
can tribes retain all the attributes of governmental power except to the
extent that those attributes are removed by treaty, by federal statute, or by
virtue of inconsistency with the tribes’ status as “domestic dependent na-
tions.”24  At least 175 of the federally recognized Indian tribes in the lower
forty-eight states have “a formal tribal court.”25  The tribal respondents in
the nuisance litigation is likely to be every bit as great as it would be were this a
criminal proceeding.”).
22. Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 460 (1990) (quoting Gulf Offshore Co. v.
Mobil Oil Corp., 453 U.S. 473, 478 (1981)).  Indeed, some case law favors concur-
rent state-court jurisdiction even more than this quotation might suggest.  Soon
after deciding Tafflin, the Court held that state courts have concurrent jurisdiction
over claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.  The Court first noted
that “Title VII contains no language that expressly confines jurisdiction to federal
courts or ousts state courts of their presumptive jurisdiction.  The omission of any
such provision is strong, and arguably sufficient, evidence that Congress had no
such intent.”  Yellow Freight Sys., Inc. v. Donnelly, 494 U.S. 820, 823 (1990).  It
proceeded to note and reject arguments based on the second and third rationales
cited in Tafflin (namely, legislative history and incompatibility). See Yellow Freight,
494 U.S. at 824.
23. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1441(a) (2006).  It seems unlikely that the state
could successfully interpose a sovereign immunity objection to the removal of a
federal question case.  In Ames v. Kansas, the Supreme Court rejected the State’s
Eleventh Amendment objection to the removal of its case from state to federal
court on federal question grounds. See Ames v. Kansas, 111 U.S. 449, 472 (1884).
It should be kept in mind, of course, that Ames predated Hans v. Louisiana, 134
U.S. 1 (1890), in which the Court held that state sovereign immunity barred a
federal question claim. See Virginia F. Milstead, State Sovereign Immunity and the
Plaintiff State: Does the Eleventh Amendment Bar Removal of Actions Filed In State Court?,
38 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 513, 525-26 (2004).  The Court’s subsequent expansion of
state sovereign immunity as a constitutional principle that extends well beyond the
letter of the Eleventh Amendment might provide some basis to challenge the ratio-
nale of Ames, but the Supreme Court has not overruled it.
24. See, e.g., United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978) (“Indian tribes
still possess those aspects of sovereignty not withdrawn by treaty or statute, or by
implication as a necessary result of their dependent status.”).
25. STEVEN W. PERRY, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
CENSUS OF TRIBAL JUSTICE AGENCIES IN INDIAN COUNTRY, 2002, at iii (2005) [herein-
after 2002 CENSUS], available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/ctjaic
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a 2002 Bureau of Justice Statistics survey reported that more than 127,000
criminal cases and more than 81,000 civil cases were filed in tribal courts
in the prior calendar year.26  As a point of comparison, during a year-long
period in federal district court in the same time frame some 275,000 civil
cases were filed27 and the federal government commenced prosecutions
in federal district court against roughly 90,000 defendants.28
Tribal courts, then, handle a large number of both civil and criminal
cases.  Those courts can provide a vital forum, not only for private liti-
gants, but for the tribe itself.  But, as this part discusses, in a series of deci-
sions since 1978 the Supreme Court has limited the tribal courts’ authority
to hear both criminal and civil matters.29
A. Criminal Jurisdiction
The federal law of tribal criminal jurisdiction is the product of an
ongoing dialogue between Congress and the Supreme Court.  Congress,
in the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, subjected tribal-court criminal pros-
ecutions to a number of constraints similar to those in the Bill of Rights,30
02.pdf.  I say “at least” because the survey report states that 314 of the 341 federally
recognized tribes in the lower forty-eight states participated in the survey, and thus
the numbers in the report may be slightly lower than the actual numbers for all
341 tribes.
26. See 2002 CENSUS, supra note 25, at tbl.11 (listing number of criminal cases
filed during last calendar year, by tribe; figures add up to 127,070); id. (listing
number of civil cases filed during last calendar year, by tribe; figures add up to
81,988).
27. See LEONIDAS RALPH MECHAM, 2002 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR, JU-
DICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS 2002 tbl.S-7 (2003), available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/ (listing “Civil Cases Filed, by Origin, 1998 Through
2002” and showing 274,841 total filings during period ending September 30, 2002;
this figure includes cases filed in federal court, cases removed from state court,
cases remanded by courts of appeals, cases that were reopened, and cases that were
transferred).
28. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, COMPENDIUM OF
FEDERAL JUSTICES STATISTICS, 2002, at tbl.4.1 (2004), available at http://
bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/cfjs02.pdf (showing number of “[d]efendants
in criminal cases commenced, by offense, October 1, 2001-September 30, 2002” as
87,727); id. at 1 (“The number of defendants prosecuted in Federal courts in-
creased slightly between 2001 and 2002, from 86,728 to 90,407.”).  The Compen-
dium does not explain the difference between the figures of 87,727 and 90,407.
29. I focus here on federal law that limits tribal regulatory authority and tri-
bal-court subject matter jurisdiction.  The Indian Civil Rights Act’s due process
clause may limit the exercise of territorial jurisdiction by tribal courts over absent
defendants. See generally David A. Castleman, Personal Jurisdiction in Tribal Courts,
154 U. PA. L. REV. 1253 (2006).
30. See Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, Title II, § 202, 82
Stat. 73, 77-78 (1968) (providing statutory rights addressing, inter alia, unreasona-
ble searches and seizure; double jeopardy; self-incrimination; speedy trial; confron-
tation; excessive bail or fines; cruel and unusual punishment; and criminal jury
trial). But see id. at 77 (providing for tribal-court criminal defendant right “at his
own expense to have the assistance of counsel for his defense”).  As discussed be-
low, Congress’s 2010 amendments to Section 1302 provide tribal-court defendants
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limited the criminal punishment that a tribe could impose,31 and pro-
vided for federal habeas review of tribal-court criminal convictions.32  The
Supreme Court—in decisions in 1978 and 1990—created limits on the
type of defendants who could be criminally prosecuted by tribes.  Con-
gress responded in 1990 with legislation that overrode the more recent of
those decisions and recognized tribes’ inherent authority to try Indians
who are members of other tribes.  The Supreme Court has acknowledged
that the 1990 legislation succeeded in altering federal constraints on tribal
authority, such that tribes’ criminal prosecutions of non-member Indians
constitute an exercise of inherent tribal authority.  But the patchwork of
criminal jurisdiction in Indian country has continued to cause severe
under-enforcement problems, and to address the resulting problems Con-
gress recently enacted the Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010.
The first of the Supreme Court decisions, Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian
Tribe,33 held that tribes lack authority to prosecute non-Indians.  “The ef-
fort by Indian tribal courts to exercise criminal jurisdiction over non-Indi-
ans,” the Court asserted, “is a relatively new phenomenon”34—and one
which, in the Court’s view, threatened the liberty interests of the non-In-
dian defendants to such an extent that such jurisdiction should be
deemed inconsistent with the tribes’ status under federal law.35  In sum,
with a right to counsel consonant with Sixth Amendment standards (including a
right to government-paid counsel for indigent defendants) in cases where the de-
fendant is sentenced to more than one year’s imprisonment. See 25 U.S.C.
§ 1302(c).
31. See Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, Title II, § 202, 82
Stat. 73, 77 (1968) (limiting punishment for any one offense to “a term of six
months or a fine of $500, or both”).  In 1986, “[t]o enhance the ability of tribal
governments to prevent and penalize the traffic of illegal narcotics on Indian res-
ervations,” Congress raised the maximum penalty per offense to one year’s impris-
onment, a $5,000 fine, or both.  Pub. L. No. 99-570, Title IV, § 4217, 100 Stat. 3207
(1986).  In 2010, as discussed below, Congress further altered the penalty ceilings
so as to permit a maximum sentence of three years or $15,000 per offense (subject
to a maximum aggregate penalty of nine years’ imprisonment) if certain require-
ments are met. See Pub. L. No. 111-211, Title II, § 234 (2010) (amending 25 U.S.C.
§ 1302 by, inter alia, redesignating existing text as subsection (a), revising that
subsection, and adding new subsections (b) and (c)).
32. See 25 U.S.C. § 1303 (2006).
33. 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
34. Id. at 196-97.  Robert Clinton has noted that
[s]ince most tribal justice systems of the nineteenth century were infor-
mal and restorative, rather than punitive, the Court not surprisingly
found few examples of Indian tribes actually punishing whites after trial
during the period.  Nevertheless, to solidify its historical point, the Court
was forced to marginalize early treaties that expressly provided that In-
dian tribes could punish illegal white settlers.
Robert N. Clinton, There Is No Federal Supremacy Clause for Indian Tribes, 34 ARIZ. ST.
L.J. 113, 214 (2002).
35. See Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 210.  The Court asserted:
[F]rom the formation of the Union and the adoption of the Bill of
Rights, the United States has manifested . . . solicitude that its citizens be
protected by the United States from unwarranted intrusions on their per-
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the Oliphant Court concluded, “Indian tribes do not have inherent juris-
diction to try and to punish non-Indians.”36
Interestingly, the first draft of Justice Rehnquist’s opinion for the
Court in Oliphant had instead concluded that “Indian tribes do not have
inherent jurisdiction to try and punish nonmembers of their tribe.”37
Within days after that draft opinion circulated, Justice Blackmun wrote to
say that he would join it;38 but Justice Blackmun also wrote separately to
Justice Rehnquist with “two very minor and picky suggestions.”39  One of
those suggestions was to change “nonmembers of their tribe” to “non-Indi-
ans”; Justice Blackmun explained that “[i]f either of the offenses charged
in this case had involved a Rosebud Sioux who was vacationing in Wash-
ington, I am not sure what the answer would be.”40  The next draft of the
opinion duly referred to “non-Indians” instead of “nonmembers.”41
The Justices were not, however, consistent in their terminology.
United States v. Wheeler,42 decided a couple of weeks after Oliphant, held
that the Navajo Nation’s prosecution of a Navajo constituted an exercise of
inherent tribal authority and thus did not trigger double jeopardy protec-
tions under the federal Constitution.43  The Wheeler Court reasoned that
the sovereign power of a tribe to prosecute its members for tribal
offenses clearly does not fall within that part of sovereignty which
the Indians implicitly lost by virtue of their dependent status.
The areas in which such implicit divestiture of sovereignty has
been held to have occurred are those involving the relations be-
tween an Indian tribe and nonmembers of the tribe.  Thus, In-
dian tribes can no longer freely alienate to non-Indians the land
they occupy. . . .  They cannot enter into direct commercial or
governmental relations with foreign nations. . . .  And, as we have
recently held, they cannot try nonmembers in tribal courts.44
sonal liberty.  The power of the United States to try and criminally punish
is an important manifestation of the power to restrict personal liberty.  By
submitting to the overriding sovereignty of the United States, Indian
tribes therefore necessarily give up their power to try non-Indian citizens
of the United States except in a manner acceptable to Congress.
Id.
36. Id. at 212.
37. First Draft Opinion, Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, at 21 (circu-
lated by Justice Rehnquist Feb. 23, 1978) (copy on file with author).
38. Memorandum from Justice Blackmun to Justice Rehnquist (Feb. 27,
1978) (copy on file with author).
39. Letter from Justice Blackmun to Justice Rehnquist (Feb. 27, 1978) (copy
on file with author).
40. Id.
41. Second Draft Opinion, Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, at 21 (circu-
lated by Justice Rehnquist Mar. 1, 1978) (copy on file with author).
42. 435 U.S. 313 (1978).
43. See id. at 328, 330 (citing Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 191).
44. Id. at 326.
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The Wheeler Court was imprecise in suggesting that Oliphant’s holding had
concerned nonmembers (as opposed to non-Indians).  And Wheeler’s hold-
ing might be explained less by the Court’s solicitude for tribal authority
than by its reluctance to jeopardize “important federal interests in the
prosecution of major offenses on Indian reservations”: if jeopardy at-
tached to a tribal prosecution, that would impair the federal government’s
own interest in exercising criminal jurisdiction.45
Nonetheless, the Wheeler Court also recognized the importance of tri-
bal criminal jurisdiction (albeit in the limited context of jurisdiction over
tribe members).  Noting that Congress could solve the double jeopardy
puzzle by preempting tribal jurisdiction, the Court pointed out that “such
a fundamental abridgment of the powers of Indian tribes might be
thought as undesirable as the federal pre-emption of state criminal juris-
diction that would have avoided” similar issues with successive state and
federal criminal prosecutions:46 “[T]ribal courts are important mecha-
nisms for protecting significant tribal interests.  Federal pre-emption of a
tribe’s jurisdiction to punish its members for infractions of tribal law
would detract substantially from tribal self-government, just as federal pre-
emption of state criminal jurisdiction would trench upon important state
interests.”47  Moreover, the fact that a tribe’s approach to criminal justice
issues might differ from that of the federal government or the states served
to underscore, in the Wheeler Court’s view, the importance of tribal crimi-
nal jurisdiction: tribes, the Court stated, have
their own mores and laws . . . which can be enforced by formal
criminal proceedings in tribal courts as well as by less formal
means.  They have a significant interest in maintaining orderly
relations among their members and in preserving tribal customs
and traditions . . . .  Tribal laws and procedures are often influ-
enced by tribal custom and can differ greatly from our own.48
But the Court would later cite such distinctive aspects of tribal justice
systems as a reason to curtail, rather than preserve, tribal criminal author-
ity.  In Duro v. Reina,49 the Court extended Oliphant to cover not only non-
Indians but also nonmember Indians.50  The Duro majority opened by stat-
ing that “the rationale of our decisions in Oliphant and Wheeler, as well as
subsequent cases, compels the conclusion that Indian tribes lack jurisdic-
tion over persons who are not tribe members.”51  As support, the majority
adduced in particular the portion of Wheeler that described Oliphant as
45. Id. at 331.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 332.
48. Id. at 331-32.
49. 495 U.S. 676 (1990).
50. Id. at 688.
51. Id. at 685.
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holding “that the tribes ‘cannot try nonmembers in tribal courts.’”52  (Jus-
tice Blackmun, who had successfully persuaded then-Justice Rehnquist to
narrow Oliphant’s wording so as not to address the question of tribal crimi-
nal jurisdiction over nonmember Indians, joined the majority opinion in
Duro.)  In the view of the Duro majority, “the retained sovereignty of the
tribe as a political and social organization to govern its own affairs” did not
encompass “the authority to impose criminal sanctions against a citizen
outside its own membership.”53  To bolster this conclusion, the Court
stressed the differences between tribal and non-tribal criminal justice
practices:
While modern tribal courts include many familiar features of the
judicial process, they are influenced by the unique customs, lan-
guages, and usages of the tribes they serve.  Tribal courts are
often “subordinate to the political branches of tribal govern-
ments,” and their legal methods may depend on “unspoken prac-
tices and norms.”  It is significant that the Bill of Rights does not
apply to Indian tribal governments.  The Indian Civil Rights Act
of 1968 provides some statutory guarantees of fair procedure, but
these guarantees are not equivalent to their constitutional coun-
terparts.  There is, for example, no right under the Act to ap-
pointed counsel for those unable to afford a lawyer.54
As the dissenting Justices pointed out in Duro, that decision “create[d]
a jurisdictional void in which neither federal nor tribal jurisdiction ex-
ist[ed] over nonmember Indians who commit[ted] minor crimes against
another Indian”55 within Indian country.56  The Major Crimes Act, as its
name suggests, imposes federal criminal penalties on Indians only for
specified major offenses.57  The General Crimes Act, which extends cer-
tain other federal criminal laws to Indian country, exempts Indian-on-In-
dian offenses.58  And except in states to which Public Law 280 has
extended criminal jurisdiction over Indian reservations,59 state govern-
ments lack criminal jurisdiction over crimes committed by Indians within
52. Id. (quoting Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 326).
53. Id. at 679.
54. Id. at 693.
55. Id. at 704-05 (Brennan, J., joined by Marshall, J., dissenting).
56. See 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (2006) (defining Indian country).
57. See id. § 1153.  The discussion in the text leaves aside federal criminal stat-
utes of general applicability, which may be interpreted to apply to conduct by Indi-
ans within Indian country.
58. See id. § 1152 (“Except as otherwise expressly provided by law, the general
laws of the United States as to the punishment of offenses committed in any place
within the sole and exclusive jurisdiction of the United States, except the District
of Columbia, shall extend to the Indian country.  This section shall not extend to
offenses committed by one Indian against the person or property of another In-
dian . . . .”); see also Duro, 495 U.S. at 705 n.3 (Brennan, J., joined by Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
59. See 18 U.S.C. § 1162 (2006).
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Indian country.  Even where a state has such jurisdiction, problems arose
because states failed to devote sufficient resources to the prosecution of
crimes committed within Indian country.
Less than six months after the Duro decision Congress overrode it by
amending the Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA).  The ICRA now defines a
tribe’s “powers of self-government” to include “the inherent power of In-
dian tribes, hereby recognized and affirmed, to exercise criminal jurisdic-
tion over all Indians.”60  In a reprise of Wheeler, the “Duro fix” legislation
was challenged on the ground that it constituted a federal delegation of
authority to the tribes, such that a tribe’s exercise of criminal jurisdiction
over a nonmember Indian triggered double jeopardy protection against a
subsequent federal prosecution.  The Supreme Court rejected that chal-
lenge in United States v. Lara, holding that “Congress does possess the con-
stitutional power to lift the restrictions on the tribes’ criminal jurisdiction
over nonmember Indians as the statute seeks to do,” and, therefore, that
the tribe’s exercise of criminal jurisdiction over Lara, a member of a dif-
ferent tribe, did not trigger double jeopardy protection.61
The Lara decision did not settle all questions relating to a tribe’s exer-
cise of criminal jurisdiction.  On the one hand, the Lara Court put to one
side Lara’s equal protection and due process challenges to his tribal crimi-
nal prosecution, because those challenges—even if successful—would not
invalidate or bar the subsequent federal prosecution.62  On the other
hand, Lara’s recognition of congressional authority to “relax[ ] restric-
tions on the bounds of the inherent tribal authority that the United States
recognizes”63 underscores the fact that Congress has the power to lift
other aspects of the federal-law constraints on tribal authority.
The bounds of tribal criminal jurisdiction are unstable because the
limits on that jurisdiction impede tribes’ ability to protect their members
and other residents of Indian country from criminal activity.  For example,
a 2005-2006 Amnesty International study of rape and sexual assault against
Native women on or near tribal lands found an extremely high incidence
of such crimes and concluded that the law enforcement response was in-
adequate.64  The Amnesty study noted that confusion over which sover-
60. Pub. L. No. 101-511, Title VIII, § 8077(b)-(c), 104 Stat. 1892 (1990) (codi-
fied at 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2)).
61. United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 200 (2004).
62. Id. at 208-09.
63. Id. at 207.
64. See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, MAZE OF INJUSTICE: THE FAILURE TO PROTECT
INDIGENOUS WOMEN FROM SEXUAL VIOLENCE IN THE USA, ii-iii (2007) [hereinafter
AMNESTY REPORT], available at http://www.amnestyusa.org/women/maze/report.
pdf (describing study); id. at 2 (citing Department of Justice figures “indicat[ing]
that Native American and Alaska Native women are more than 2.5 times more
likely to be raped or sexually assaulted than women in the USA in general” and
stating that Amnesty International’s interviews indicate “that available statistics
greatly underestimate the severity of the problem”); id. at 8 (stating that jurisdic-
tional framework in Indian country “has created areas of effective lawlessness
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eign—tribal, federal, or state—has jurisdiction over a particular crime
often delays prosecution and can contribute to a total failure to prose-
cute.65  Tribal prosecutions are limited in their effectiveness for several
reasons.66  Tribal justice systems are underfunded.67  Tribal prosecutors
sometimes defer to federal prosecutors on the (often mistaken) assump-
tion that the federal government will choose to prosecute.68  Tribes, as
noted above, are currently barred by federal law from prosecuting non-
Indians—who, some data suggest, commit a sizeable number of sex crimes
against Native women in and around Indian country.69  And even when a
tribe has criminal jurisdiction, until 2010 the ICRA limited tribal-court
criminal sentences to a maximum of one year for any one offense.70
Federal and state prosecutions do not adequately fill this void.  First,
the federal government does not have general criminal jurisdiction in all
parts of Indian country.  Public Law 280, a termination-era statute that
granted certain states criminal jurisdiction over certain reservations and
provided for the assumption by states of such jurisdiction over other reser-
vations, removed federal criminal jurisdiction over crimes (other than vio-
lations of generally-applicable federal criminal statutes) committed within
which encourages violence”).  The report notes that the currently available statis-
tics do not focus on crimes committed within Indian country. Id. at 4.
65. See AMNESTY REPORT, supra note 64, at 61-62.
66. In addition to the reasons noted in the text, the Amnesty Report also
observes that some tribal codes fail to criminalize all instances of sexual violence—
for example, some codes do not define marital rape as a crime.  The report notes
various possible reasons for the persistence of such features in tribal law—such as
the lack of funding to support updates of tribal codes or a perception that federal
law prohibits tribes from exercising jurisdiction over major crimes. See id. at 63.
67. See id. at 63-64.
68. See id. at 63.
69. The Amnesty Report states:
Some of the data made available to Amnesty International in the three
locations studied . . . suggests that a high number of perpetrators of sex-
ual violence against American Indian and Alaska Native women are non-
Indian.  In Oklahoma, one support worker for Native American survivors
of sexual violence told Amnesty International that 58 percent of the cases
she had worked on in the preceding 18 months involved non-Native per-
petrators.  In Anchorage, Alaska, a statistical study found that 57.7 per-
cent of Alaska Native victims of sexual violence reported that their
attackers had been non-Native men.  Amnesty International documented
individual cases involving both Native and non-Native perpetrators.
While overall the data available appears to indicate that a significant
number of perpetrators are non-Indian, there is a lack of quantitative
data on the ethnic origin or Indigenous status of perpetrators of sexual
violence against American Indian and Alaska Native women.
Id. at 5.
70. See supra note 31; see also AMNESTY REPORT, supra note 64, at 64 (noting
that “some prosecuting authorities may charge suspected perpetrators with multi-
ple offences, providing the possibility of imposing consecutive sentences in the
event of conviction”).
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certain affected reservations.71  Second, even where the federal govern-
ment has criminal jurisdiction, federal prosecutors may exercise their dis-
cretion not to prosecute crimes committed in Indian country.  While
federal prosecutors declined to prosecute 21.5% of suspects referred for
prosecution by any federal agency, they declined to prosecute 47.9% of
suspects referred for prosecution by the Bureau of Indian Affairs—a dif-
ference in rate that does not establish the rate at which Indian country
crimes are federally prosecuted but that is suggestive.72  The findings in a
Senate bill precursor to the Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010 stated that
“during the period of calendar years 2004 through 2007, federal officials
declined to prosecute 62 percent of violent crimes alleged to have oc-
curred in Indian country.”73  As to sex offenses in Indian country, the Am-
nesty International report found some evidence to suggest that federal
prosecutors “may be applying overly stringent criteria for selecting cases
for prosecution.”74  Third, practical problems also may deter the pursuit
of criminal charges, given that the nearest federal prosecutor may be lo-
cated far from the crime scene and from the victim’s residence.
States have criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians who commit crimes
within Indian country, and in some instances, Public Law 280 has also
given them jurisdiction to prosecute Indian offenders.  Periodic reports,
however, suggest that a number of states devote insufficient resources to
prosecuting offenses committed within Indian country.75  Moreover, state
or local prosecutors may not be located near the crime scene or the victim
71. See Carole Goldberg-Ambrose, Public Law 280 and the Problem of Lawlessness
in California Indian Country, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1405, 1416 (1997) (explaining that
Public Law 280 “extended state criminal jurisdiction and civil judicial jurisdiction
over reservation Indians in certain states [and] eliminated special federal criminal
jurisdiction over reservation areas in the states specifically named in the law”).
72. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, COMPENDIUM OF
FEDERAL JUSTICE STATISTICS, 2004, at tbl.2.3 (2006) (“Suspects in matters con-
cluded and declined, by investigating agency, October 1, 2003 - September 30,
2004.”).
73. S. 797, 111th Cong. § 2(a)(10) (2009).  The committee report accompa-
nying this bill noted “that declination statistics alone do not show the Department
[of Justice]’s commitment to combating reservation crime.  In fact, they likely re-
flect difficulties caused by the justice system in place. The lack of police on the
ground in Indian country often results in delayed responses to criminal activity,
which prevents officers from securing the crime scene and gathering evidence.” S.
REP. NO. 111-93, at 14 (2009).  The Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010 “author-
ize[s] and encourage[s]” U.S. Attorneys in districts that encompass Indian country
to appoint special assistant U.S. Attorneys to prosecute Indian country crimes
when, inter alia, “the rate at which criminal offenses are declined to be prosecuted
exceeds the national average declination rate.” See Pub. L. No. 111-211, Title II,
§ 213(b) (2010).
74. AMNESTY REPORT, supra note 64, at 66.
75. So, for example, seventeen of nineteen tribes that responded to a 1990s
survey of California tribes “complained of serious gaps in protection from county
law enforcement.”  Goldberg-Ambrose, supra note 71, at 1437.
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and their decisions may sometimes reflect a lack of familiarity with the
culture and experiences of the complainant.76
To address these problems, the Amnesty International report sug-
gested (among other things) that the federal government should recog-
nize tribal criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians and that it should lift or
otherwise modify the current limits on tribal criminal penalties.77  In
2010, Congress implemented the second of these suggestions.  The Tribal
Law and Order Act of 2010 raised the maximum tribal penalty per offense
to three years or $15,000, or both—provided that certain requirements
concerning prior convictions or type of offense are met, and that (in the
case of sentences of imprisonment for more than one year) the tribe in
question affords the defendant a right to counsel compliant with Sixth
Amendment standards (including government-paid counsel if the defen-
dant is indigent), the judge trying the case is legally trained and licensed
to practice law, the tribe’s criminal laws and evidentiary and procedural
rules are publicly available, and a record is made of the criminal
proceeding.78
It is interesting to note that the 2010 legislation rolled back federal
limits on tribal criminal penalties while requiring the resulting prosecu-
tions to comply with new requirements such as government-paid counsel
for indigent defendants.  The absence of such a right to government-paid
counsel was one of the features of tribal criminal justice systems cited by
the Duro Court as a reason not to permit tribal prosecution of nonmem-
bers.79  Under the 2010 legislation, tribes may regain some measure of the
criminal jurisdiction otherwise foreclosed to them under federal law only
by mirroring more closely the criminal procedures employed in non-tribal
courts.80  And the vindication of the relevant procedural guarantees by
76. See AMNESTY REPORT, supra note 64, at 69.
77. See id. at 63.
78. See Pub. L. No. 111-211, Title II, § 234 (2010) (amending 25 U.S.C. § 1302
by redesignating the existing content as subsection (a), revising that subsection,
and adding new subsections (b) through (f)).  The legislation limits the total ag-
gregate penalty that can be imposed for multiple offenses to nine years, see 25
U.S.C. § 1302(a)(7)(D), and designates the facilities in which tribal sentences
longer than a year are to be served, see id. § 1302(d).
79. See Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 693 (1990) (“The Indian Civil Rights Act
of 1968 provides some statutory guarantees of fair procedure, but these guarantees
are not equivalent to their constitutional counterparts.  There is, for example, no
right under the Act to appointed counsel for those unable to afford a lawyer.”).
80. Indian tribes are not among the governments bound by the Constitution’s
Bill of Rights. See Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 384 (1896) (“[A]s the powers of
local self-government enjoyed by the Cherokee Nation existed prior to the consti-
tution, they are not operated upon by the fifth amendment . . . .”).  The Indian
Civil Rights Act, as originally enacted, imposed on tribes statutory constraints that
echoed most of the provisions in the Bill of Rights. See Indian Civil Rights Act of
1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, Title II, § 202, 82 Stat. 73, 77-78 (1968) (enumerating
constraints on a tribe’s governmental powers; the list omitted, inter alia, a bar on
the establishment of religion and a requirement of government-paid counsel for
indigent criminal defendants). See generally Nell Jessup Newton, Tribal Court Praxis:
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the tribal courts continues to be subject to review—by means of habeas
petitions—in federal court.
B. Civil and Regulatory Jurisdiction
The line of cases that commenced with Oliphant is not limited to tribal
criminal jurisdiction; it has dramatically affected tribal civil and regulatory
authority as well.  This section discusses civil regulatory and adjudicatory
authority together, because—as we shall see—the Supreme Court’s deci-
sions conflate them.  The Justices’ concern about tribal authority over
nonmembers—noted above with respect to criminal jurisdiction—also in-
fluences their views of tribal civil and regulatory jurisdiction.81
A few years after deciding Oliphant, the Supreme Court held in Mon-
tana v. United States82 that the Crow Tribe of Montana lacked jurisdiction
to regulate fishing and hunting by non-Indians on land owned in fee by a
non-Indian within the boundaries of the Tribe’s reservation.83  As noted
above, the traditional federal-law presumption had been that tribes re-
tained all their governmental powers except to the extent those powers
were removed by treaty or statute, or by virtue of inconsistency with the
tribes’ status under federal law.  In Montana, the Court inverted this pre-
sumption with respect to a tribe’s efforts to regulate nonmembers:84
“[E]xercise of tribal power beyond what is necessary to protect tribal self-
government or to control internal relations,” the Montana Court reasoned,
“is inconsistent with the dependent status of the tribes, and so cannot sur-
vive without express congressional delegation.”85  Thus, in the Court’s
view, the hunting and fishing regulations at issue in the case fell outside
the Tribe’s inherent authority.86  The Court did, however, recognize some
circumstances under which that authority extends to nonmembers:
One Year in the Life of Twenty Indian Tribal Courts, 22 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 285, 343
(1998) (discussing tribal courts’ interpretations of ICRA).  As noted above, the
2010 amendments to 25 U.S.C. § 1302 add right-to-counsel requirements in cases
where the tribe imposes more than a year’s imprisonment.
81. See, e.g., Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 384 (2001) (Souter, J., joined by
Kennedy & Thomas, JJ., concurring) (“[A] presumption against tribal-court civil
jurisdiction squares with one of the principal policy considerations underlying Oli-
phant, namely, an overriding concern that citizens who are not tribal members be
‘protected . . . from unwarranted intrusions on their personal liberty.’” (citing
Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 210 (1978))).
82. 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
83. See id. at 547, 566-67.
84. See Gloria Valencia-Weber, Shrinking Indian Country: A State Offensive to
Divest Tribal Sovereignty, 27 CONN. L. REV. 1281, 1315 (1995) (noting that in Mon-
tana “the Court shifted the burden to the tribe to establish its regulatory power
over non-Indians by reversing the presumption against state power to a presump-
tion against tribal power”).
85. Montana, 450 U.S. at 564.
86. See id.
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Indian tribes retain inherent sovereign power to exercise some
forms of civil jurisdiction over non-Indians on their reservations,
even on non-Indian fee lands.  A tribe may regulate, through tax-
ation, licensing, or other means, the activities of nonmembers
who enter consensual relationships with the tribe or its members,
through commercial dealing, contracts, leases, or other arrange-
ments. . . .  A tribe may also retain inherent power to exercise
civil authority over the conduct of non-Indians on fee lands
within its reservation when that conduct threatens or has some
direct effect on the political integrity, the economic security, or
the health or welfare of the tribe.87
The Court has subsequently extended Montana in two significant
ways.  First, it has held that the Montana limits on tribal civil regulatory
authority also mark the bounds of tribal-court civil adjudicative author-
ity88—a peculiar notion in light of non-tribal courts’ well-established prac-
tice of hearing claims arising under laws other than their own.89  Second,
the Court has applied the Montana limits not only to conduct on land
owned by non-Indians but also to conduct occurring on tribally owned
land within the reservation90—though it has indicated that the Montana
limits are especially stringent “when the nonmember’s activity occurs on
land owned in fee simple by non-Indians.”91
In applying the exceptions to the general Montana limits on tribal
authority, the Court has taken a relatively narrow view of both the consen-
sual-relationship exception92 and the exception relating to the tribe’s po-
litical integrity, economic security, or health and welfare.93  Most recently,
in Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land and Cattle Co.,94 the Court held
that neither of the Montana exceptions justified tribal-court jurisdiction
87. Id. at 565-66.
88. See Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 453 (1997) (“As to nonmem-
bers . . . a tribe’s adjudicative jurisdiction does not exceed its legislative
jurisdiction.”).
89. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 82 (Alexander Hamilton) (“The judiciary
power of every government looks beyond its own local or municipal laws, and in
civil cases, lays hold of all subjects of litigation between parties within its jurisdic-
tion, though the causes of dispute are relative to the laws of the most distant part
of the globe.  Those of Japan, not less than of New York, may furnish the objects of
legal discussion to our courts.”).
90. Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 360 (2001) (“The ownership status of land,
in other words, is only one factor to consider in determining whether regulation of
the activities of nonmembers is ‘necessary to protect tribal self-government or to
control internal relations.’  It may sometimes be a dispositive factor.”).
91. Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle Co., 128 S. Ct. 2709,
2719 (2008).
92. See, e.g., Hicks, 533 U.S. at 355-56, 359 n.3 (refusing to apply consensual-
relationship exception to claims arising from state game warden’s search of tribe
member’s home pursuant to tribal-court search warrant).
93. See id. at 371.
94. 128 S. Ct. 2709 (2008).
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over claims by tribe members (the Longs) and their family-run company
against their long-time bank.95  Mr. Long’s father (a non-Indian) had
mortgaged to the bank more than 2,000 acres of his land within the reser-
vation.96  The bank and the company entered into an agreement under
which the bank would cancel some of the company’s debt and loan it
more money, and in exchange the 2,000+ acres would be deeded to the
bank by Mr. Long, Senior’s estate in lieu of foreclosure.97  The parties also
agreed that the company would lease the 2,000+ acres from the bank with
an option to purchase after two years.98  The Longs asserted that the bank
initially contemplated selling the land to the company over the course of
twenty years, but then rejected this possibility because of “ ‘possible juris-
dictional problems’ that might have been caused by the Bank financing an
‘Indian owned entity on the reservation.’”99  Ultimately, the Longs and
their company sued the bank in tribal court, claiming, inter alia, that the
bank discriminated against them in violation of tribal law by selling the
land to a non-tribe-member on more favorable terms.100
The Plains Commerce Bank Court conceded the possibility that the
Montana exceptions would justify a tribe in regulating a nonmember’s con-
duct on non-Indian land within the reservation—though it also stated that
it had upheld such regulation, post-Montana, in only one prior in-
stance.101  In any event, the Court concluded, even though a tribe can
sometimes regulate nonmember conduct on non-Indian-owned land within
the reservation, it cannot regulate a non-Indian’s sale of that land.102  The
Court indicated that the latter type of regulation does not fall within the
second Montana exception:
The tribe cannot justify regulation of such land’s sale by ref-
erence to its power to superintend tribal land . . . because non-
Indian fee parcels have ceased to be tribal land.
Nor can regulation of fee land sales be justified by the tribe’s
interests in protecting internal relations and self-government.
Any direct harm to its political integrity that the tribe sustains as
a result of fee land sale is sustained at the point the land passes
from Indian to non-Indian hands.  It is at that point the tribe and
its members lose the ability to use the land for their purposes.
Once the land has been sold in fee simple to non-Indians and
passed beyond the tribe’s immediate control, the mere resale of
95. See id. at 2714.
96. See id. at 2715.
97. See id.
98. See id.
99. Id.
100. See id. at 2715-16.
101. Id. at 2722 (citing Brendale v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of Yakima
Nation, 492 U.S. 408 (1989)).
102. See id. at 2723-24.
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that land works no additional intrusion on tribal relations or self-
government.  Resale, by itself, causes no additional damage.103
As to the first Montana exception, the Court acknowledged that the Longs
and their company had a long-established course of dealing with the bank,
but it held that this course of dealing could not bring the Longs’ discrimi-
nation claim within the compass of the consensual-relationship exception:
The Bank may reasonably have anticipated that its various com-
mercial dealings with the Longs could trigger tribal authority to
regulate those transactions—a question we need not and do not
decide.  But there is no reason the Bank should have anticipated
that its general business dealings with respondents would permit
the Tribe to regulate the Bank’s sale of land it owned in fee
simple.104
Four Justices partially dissented in Plains Commerce Bank, arguing that
the first Montana exception applied and permitted the plaintiffs’ tribal-
court damages claim for discrimination.105  One might also question—in
light of recent events—the assumption that land transactions between
non-Indians concerning land within a reservation never implicate the
tribe’s governmental interests.  The experience of municipalities around
the country in connection with the foreclosure crisis might suggest
differently.
Leaving these questions aside, however, the Plains Commerce Bank deci-
sion should not be taken to guide the treatment of cases that do not in-
volve sales of land by one non-Indian to another.  As the Court itself
emphasized, “conduct taking place on the land and the sale of the land
are two very different things,” and thus the Plains Commerce Bank decision
should be read to leave intact Montana’s principle “that, in certain circum-
stances, tribes may exercise authority over the conduct of nonmembers,
even if that conduct takes place on non-Indian fee land.”106  Cases will
arise that fall within one or both of the Montana exceptions.  Indeed, the
tribal respondents in a recent survey reported that over 8,800 civil cases
involving non-Indian defendants were filed in tribal courts during the
prior calendar year.107
Cases brought by the tribe itself should be particularly likely to fall
within a Montana exception.  Many such claims may be brought, for exam-
ple, precisely to vindicate the types of interests that implicate the second
103. Id. at 2723-24; see also id. at 2727 (holding explicitly that second Montana
exception did not apply).
104. Id. at 2725.
105. Id. at 2728 (Ginsburg, J., joined by Stevens, Souter & Breyer, JJ., dissent-
ing in part).
106. Id. at 2726 (majority opinion).
107. See 2002 CENSUS, supra note 25, at tbl.11 (listing number of civil cases,
filed during prior calendar year, in which a defendant was non-Indian; figures add
up to 8,808).
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Montana exception—the tribe’s interests in protecting its political or eco-
nomic security or the health and welfare of its members.  But where
neither of the Montana exceptions applies, claims against nonmembers for
conduct occurring on non-Indian land will fall outside tribal regulatory
authority, and any claims by the tribe must be grounded in non-tribal law
and brought in non-tribal court.  It is to tribal suits in non-tribal court,
therefore, that I turn in the next part.
IV. TRIBAL SUITS IN NON-TRIBAL COURTS
The default rule that applies to the federal and state governments—
that they presumptively may sue in their own courts—frequently does not
apply to tribes.  As noted in the preceding section, limits on tribal court
subject matter jurisdiction will often require a tribe to sue a nonmember,
if at all, in a non-tribal court.  That fact has a number of implications for
the tribe’s ability to vindicate its rights.  Suit in another sovereign’s courts
may be burdensome and inconvenient, due both to the physical distance
between the tribe and the relevant state or federal court and to the fact
that the court system in question may apply procedures that differ from
those applied in the relevant tribal court.  Moreover, the relative disadvan-
tages to a sovereign when it must sue in another sovereign’s courts flow
not merely from general differences in procedure between the two court
systems, but also from the fact that in the other court system it likely will
not receive the same sorts of special procedural protections that sover-
eigns often accord themselves in their own courts.  These disadvantages
may significantly affect a tribe’s ability to prevail on its claims in another
sovereign’s courts.  But I wish to focus here on a further question: can a
tribe’s suit in a non-tribal court subject the tribe to liability on a defen-
dant’s counterclaim, and, if so, in what circumstances?
As we shall see, that question is one that also affects other sovereign
litigants—the federal government, the state governments, and foreign
countries—when they bring suit in a court within the United States.  In
each instance, a sovereign’s assertion of a claim may sometimes subject
that sovereign to liability on a counterclaim despite the fact that the sover-
eign would otherwise have been immune from suit on such a claim.  The
degree to which a sovereign’s suit subjects it to liability for a counterclaim
varies depending on whether the sovereign in question is a federal, state,
foreign, or tribal government.  This part reviews those variations and ar-
gues that, of the four types of sovereigns, tribes possess the strongest argu-
ments for construing narrowly the availability of counterclaims in such
situations.
At the outset, it is necessary to briefly review the doctrinal and policy
bases for sovereign immunity.  The doctrinal bases for the doctrine vary
depending on the sovereign in question.  States are now recognized to
possess a constitutional immunity from unconsented suits by individuals—
\\server05\productn\v\vlr\55-4\vlr405.txt unknown Seq: 21  7-JAN-11 11:59
2010] NATIVE AMERICAN NATIONS IN COURT 949
an immunity grounded not only in the Eleventh Amendment108 but in the
structure of the Constitution.109  The federal government’s immunity
from unconsented suits by individuals is well recognized, although—apart
from the constitutional provision requiring appropriations for govern-
ment expenditures—federal sovereign immunity is a creature of case
law.110  Foreign nations historically possessed immunity from suit in
United States courts as a matter of comity (not as a matter of constitu-
tional command);111 that immunity has now been codified and defined in
the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act.112  Native American nations’ im-
munity rests neither on the Constitution nor on a federal statute; rather, it
has long been recognized as a matter of federal common law.113
Various rationales have been adduced for maintaining a sovereign’s
immunity from suit.114  Immunity protects the sovereign’s monetary re-
sources115 and permits those resources to be directed according to the
decisions made by the political branches of the sovereign’s govern-
108. U.S. CONST. amend. XI (“The Judicial power of the United States shall
not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted
against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or
Subjects of any Foreign State.”).
109. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 713 (1999) (“[A]s the Constitution’s
structure, its history, and the authoritative interpretations by this Court make
clear, the States’ immunity from suit is a fundamental aspect of the sovereignty
which the States enjoyed before the ratification of the Constitution, and which
they retain today . . . except as altered by the plan of the Convention or certain
constitutional Amendments.”).
110. See, e.g., Vicki C. Jackson, Suing the Federal Government: Sovereignty, Immu-
nity, and Judicial Independence, 35 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 521, 544-45 (2003) (“As
early as the 1850s, the Court identified the appropriations power as the basis for
requiring a specific statute authorizing awards of monetary relief against the trea-
sury before judicial relief could be granted.”); Gregory C. Sisk, A Primer on the Doc-
trine of Federal Sovereign Immunity, 58 OKLA. L. REV. 439, 446-56 (2005) (discussing
key Supreme Court decisions relating to federal sovereign immunity).
111. See Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 689 (2004) (citing
“Chief Justice Marshall’s observation that foreign sovereign immunity is a matter of
grace and comity rather than a constitutional requirement”).
112. See Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat. 2891 (1976) (codified at, inter alia, 28
U.S.C. §§ 1602-11 (2006)).
113. See Struve, supra note 1, at 148 (“[C]ommentators (and the Court itself)
have assumed that the Supreme Court did not specifically recognize tribal sover-
eign immunity until 1919 at the earliest.  However, the Court’s 1850 decision in
Parks v. Ross displays reasoning strikingly similar to that found in sovereign immu-
nity doctrine.”).
114. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Against Sovereign Immunity, 53 STAN. L. REV.
1201, 1216 (2001) (identifying and rejecting six possible rationales: “the impor-
tance of protecting government treasuries; separation of powers; the absence of
authority for suits against the government; the existence of adequate alternative
remedies; a curb on bureaucratic powers; and tradition”).
115. See, e.g., Hess v. Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corp., 513 U.S. 30, 48
(1994) (“[T]he impetus for the Eleventh Amendment [is] the prevention of fed-
eral-court judgments that must be paid out of a State’s treasury.”).
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ment.116  Immunity provides some measure of protection for the sover-
eign’s discretion to determine how to govern, free of judicial interference.
When the immunity protects one sovereign against private suits author-
ized by another, it may help to maintain the balance of authority between
the two types of sovereigns—a value that the Supreme Court has stressed
in supporting its expansive view of state sovereign immunity.117  (How-
ever, the fact that government officials may be sued on federal claims for
prospective injunctive relief118 helps to ensure that, overall, the govern-
ments in question comply with the dictates of federal law.)  And immunity
can be argued to protect “dignity” interests of the government by prevent-
ing it from being dragged into court against its will by an individual.119
Against these arguments for sovereign immunity one must weigh the
value of providing a judicial remedy to those whom a government has in-
jured.  Injured claimants deserve compensation.  And, as Judith Resnik
and Julie Chi-hye Suk have pointed out, a government shows most dignity
when it takes responsibility for the harm it has done.120  These arguments
help to explain why governments—federal, state, and tribal—show a trend
toward waiving their immunity to certain types of suits and for certain
remedies.121
But all three types of governments continue to rely on immunity
across a wide range of situations.  And, as I and others have noted, the
policy arguments in favor of tribal sovereign immunity seem stronger than
116. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 751 (1999) (stating that “the allocation
of scarce resources among competing needs and interests lies at the heart of the
political process”).
117. See, e.g., id. at 750 (“[A]n unlimited congressional power to authorize
suits in state court to levy upon the treasuries of the States for compensatory dam-
ages, attorney’s fees, and even punitive damages could create staggering burdens,
giving Congress a power and a leverage over the States that is not contemplated by
our constitutional design.”).
118. See Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159-60 (1908) (regarding state official).
The Supreme Court has indicated that the same type of avenue exists for suits
against tribal officials for prospective injunctive relief—but only, of course, if the
plaintiff has a cause of action. See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 59,
70 (1978) (concluding that tribal sovereign immunity did not bar claim for injunc-
tive relief against Pueblo’s governor but that non-habeas claims under Indian Civil
Rights Act could be brought only in tribal court).
119. See, e.g., Ex parte Ayers, 123 U.S. 443, 505 (1887) (“The very object and
purpose of the eleventh amendment were to prevent the indignity of subjecting a
state to the coercive process of judicial tribunals at the instance of private
parties.”).
120. See Judith Resnik & Julie Chi-hye Suk, Adding Insult to Injury: Questioning
the Role of Dignity in Conceptions of Sovereignty, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1921, 1928 (2003).
121. See, e.g., Lauren K. Robel, Sovereignty and Democracy: The States’ Obligations
to Their Citizens Under Federal Statutory Law, 78 IND. L.J. 543, 548-53 (2003) (discuss-
ing states’ trend toward narrowing state immunity from suit); Andrea M. Seielstad,
The Recognition and Evolution of Tribal Sovereign Immunity Under Federal Law: Legal,
Historical, and Normative Reflections on a Fundamental Aspect of American Indian Sover-
eignty, 37 TULSA L. REV. 661, 744-48 (2002) (discussing provision of remedies by
various tribes); Struve, supra note 1, at 156-60 (same).
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those in favor of state or federal sovereign immunity.  For example, pro-
tection against money judgments can be particularly vital for tribes, many
of which have very limited resources.122  And dignity-based arguments—
which have been much criticized in connection with state sovereign immu-
nity123—may be more persuasive with respect to tribal immunity.124
Even where sovereign immunity exists, it can be waived.  A govern-
ment may consent to be sued, and if it does so, then sovereign immunity
will present no barrier to the suit.  Of central importance to our analysis, a
government can, under certain circumstances, waive its immunity (to at
least some extent) by asserting a claim of its own.
Thus, if the federal government sues a defendant, that defendant can
assert a counterclaim against the federal plaintiff arising from the same
transaction.125  Congress has set some procedural requirements for the
defendant—it generally must show that the claim was presented to the
Government Accountability Office and was disallowed126—but so long as
122. See, e.g., Amelia A. Fogleman, Sovereign Immunity of Indian Tribes: A Propo-
sal For Statutory Waiver For Tribal Businesses, 79 VA. L. REV. 1345, 1349 (1993)
(“Courts and commentators have justified the continued existence of tribal sover-
eign immunity primarily as a means to protect scarce tribal resources.”).
123. See, e.g., Daniel J. Meltzer, State Sovereign Immunity: Five Authors in Search of
a Theory, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1011, 1040 (2000) (“The notion that respecting
state dignity requires not merely regulating the forum but also restricting congres-
sional power to authorize private suit at all is . . . difficult to integrate with the
American constitutional tradition.”).
124. Cf. Resnik & Suk, supra note 120, at 1927 (arguing that “institutional
dignity” can usefully “enabl[e] a fledgling organization—be it a court or a na-
tion—to function”); id. at 1928 (concluding that dignity concerns do not justify
sovereign immunity but conceding that “[a]ccommodations to respect institu-
tional role-dignity and to facilitate governance may be crafted, for example, by
courts limiting the kinds of remedies to be imposed or by shaping special formats
for adjudication of disputes involving states”).
125. See FDIC v. Hulsey, 22 F.3d 1472, 1487 (10th Cir. 1994) (“In order to
constitute a claim in recoupment (1) the claim must arise from the same transac-
tion or occurrence as the plaintiff’s suit; (2) the claim must seek relief of the same
kind or nature; and (3) the claim must seek an amount not in excess of the plain-
tiff’s claim.”); GREGORY C. SISK, LITIGATION WITH THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT: CASES
AND MATERIALS 958 (2000) (“[T]he courts generally have interpreted the implicit
consent to a set-off by the defendant as limited to counterclaims that are both
defensive in nature and related in substance to the government’s affirmative
claim.”); Gil Seinfeld, Waiver-in-Litigation: Eleventh Amendment Immunity and the Vol-
untariness Question, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 871, 888-89 (2002) (“The lower federal courts
have qualified [the waiver] rule by explaining that the government’s waiver of im-
munity is restricted to claims arising out of the transaction upon which the govern-
ment’s suit is based.”).
126. 28 U.S.C. § 2406 provides:
In an action by the United States against an individual, evidence support-
ing the defendant’s claim for a credit shall not be admitted unless he first
proves that such claim has been disallowed, in whole or in part, by the
Government Accountability Office, or that he has, at the time of the trial,
obtained possession of vouchers not previously procurable and has been
prevented from presenting such claim to the Government Accountability
Office by absence from the United States or unavoidable accident.
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the defendant complies with those statutory requisites it can reduce the
government’s recovery by the amount of the counterclaim.  However, the
counterclaim can serve only the defensive function of reducing the gov-
ernment’s recovery; it cannot result in affirmative liability for the govern-
ment.127  Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 13(a)’s compulsory-
counterclaim provision generally requires a defendant to assert any claim
it has against the plaintiff “aris[ing] out of the transaction or occurrence
that is the subject matter of the opposing party’s claim.”  Civil Rule 13(d),
however, points out that “[t]hese rules do not expand the right to assert a
counterclaim—or to claim a credit—against the United States or a United
States officer or agency.”  Even if Civil Rule 13(d) did not exist, it would
seem clear that Civil Rule 13(a) could not affect a government plaintiff’s
immunity from liability on a counterclaim.  Sovereign immunity, though
waivable, could be viewed as otherwise akin to a limit on subject matter
jurisdiction,128 and it is well established that the Civil Rules do not extend
courts’ subject matter jurisdiction.129  Moreover, a Civil Rule that pur-
ported to alter the scope of sovereign immunity would seem to run afoul
of the Rules Enabling Act’s requirement that rules adopted through the
rulemaking process “shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive
right.”130
Similar, though apparently not identical, principles of waiver govern a
state’s immunity from suit.  States, like other governments, can waive im-
munity from suit.131  For example, in Lapides v. Board of Regents of the Uni-
versity System of Georgia,132 the Court held that a state agency waived its
immunity from suit by removing a case involving state-law claims on which
28 U.S.C. § 2406 (2006).  Statutory predecessors of § 2406 have existed since the
late 1790s.  For discussion of one such prior statute, see United States v. Wilkins, 19
U.S. 135, 143 (1821) (“The object of the act seems to be to liquidate and adjust all
accounts between the parties, and to require a judgment for such sum only, as the
defendant in equity and justice should be proved to owe to the United States.”).
127. See United States v. Shaw, 309 U.S. 495, 502 (1940) (“Against the back-
ground of complete immunity we find no Congressional action modifying the im-
munity rule in favor of cross-actions beyond the amount necessary as a set-off.”);
United States v. Eckford, 73 U.S. 484, 489 (1867) (“Claims for credit in suits
against persons indebted to the United States, if it appears that the claim had
previously been presented to the accounting officers of the treasury for their exam-
ination, and had been by them disallowed, in whole or in part, may be admitted
upon the trial of the suit, but it can only be admitted as a claim for a credit, and
not as a demand for judgment.”).
128. But see Caleb Nelson, Sovereign Immunity as a Doctrine of Personal Jurisdic-
tion, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1559, 1615-17 (2002) (arguing that Eleventh Amendment
imposes limit on subject matter jurisdiction but that state immunity in cases not
addressed by Eleventh Amendment can be viewed as implicating principles of per-
sonal jurisdiction rather than subject matter jurisdiction).
129. See FED. R. CIV. P. 82.
130. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b).
131. See generally Jonathan R. Siegel, Waivers of State Sovereign Immunity and the
Ideology of the Eleventh Amendment, 52 DUKE L.J. 1167 (2003).
132. 535 U.S. 613 (2002).
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the agency would have been subject to suit in state court.  As the Lapides
Court explained,
It would seem anomalous or inconsistent for a State both (1) to
invoke federal jurisdiction, thereby contending that the “Judicial
power of the United States” extends to the case at hand, and (2)
to claim Eleventh Amendment immunity, thereby denying that
the “Judicial power of the United States” extends to the case at
hand.  And a Constitution that permitted States to follow their
litigation interests by freely asserting both claims in the same case
could generate seriously unfair results.133
The Lapides Court distinguished both a case concerning the federal
government’s liability on a counterclaim134 and cases addressing similar
questions concerning tribal-government plaintiffs,135 explaining that
[t]hose cases . . . do not involve the Eleventh Amendment—a
specific text with a history that focuses upon the State’s sover-
eignty vis-à-vis the Federal Government.  And each case involves
special circumstances not at issue here, for example, an effort by
a sovereign (i.e., the United States) to seek the protection of its
own courts (i.e., the federal courts), or an effort to protect an
Indian tribe.136
It is, perhaps, because the principles governing state sovereign immu-
nity are distinguishable from those concerning federal sovereign immu-
nity that the scope of permissible counterclaims against state-government
plaintiffs appears somewhat hazier.  Some courts, admittedly, take the view
that state-government plaintiffs should be treated like federal government
plaintiffs, and thus that any counterclaim against the state must arise from
the same transaction or occurrence as the state’s claim, must seek a similar
type of relief as the state’s claim, and can only be used defensively.137  But
some other courts appear not to impose any requirement that the defen-
dant’s counterclaim be limited to the amount sought by the state.  So, for
example, the Federal Circuit has held that when a state brings patent
claims in federal court it thereby waives immunity with respect to any com-
pulsory counterclaims.138  And in a number of pre-2004 appellate cases, a
133. Id. at 619.
134. See id. at 623 (citing United States v. Shaw, 309 U.S. 495 (1940)).
135. See id. (citing United States v. U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 309 U.S. 506
(1940), and Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Tribe of Okla., 498
U.S. 505 (1991)).
136. Id. at 623.
137. See Texas v. Caremark, Inc., 584 F.3d 655, 659 (5th Cir. 2009); see also id.
at n.1 (“[T]here is no reason to distinguish between waiver asserted by the United
States and that asserted on the basis of state sovereign immunity.”).
138. See Regents of Univ. of N.M. v. Knight, 321 F.3d 1111, 1126 (Fed. Cir.
2003) (“[B]y filing suit for a declaration of patent ownership and inventorship
based on certain contracts and conduct, UNM waived its Eleventh Amendment
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circuit split developed concerning the effect of a state’s decision to file a
proof of claim in a bankruptcy proceeding, with at least one court deter-
mining that the state’s filing of the proof of claim subjected it to the full
amount of any counterclaims arising from the same transaction or
occurrence.139
The Supreme Court’s subsequent decisions in Tennessee Student Assis-
tance Corp. v. Hood140 and Central Virginia Community College v. Katz141 may
have diminished the need to resolve this particular question of waiver:
Katz’s holding that “[i]n ratifying the Bankruptcy Clause, the States acqui-
esced in a subordination of whatever sovereign immunity they might oth-
erwise have asserted in proceedings necessary to effectuate the in rem
jurisdiction of the bankruptcy courts”142 might reduce the need to rely on
a waiver rationale to deal with counterclaims against a state that has sub-
mitted a proof of claim in bankruptcy.  But the underlying views that gave
rise to the circuit split continue to be of interest, to the extent that they
suggest a willingness to subject states to somewhat more stringent ground
rules than the federal government.  The First Circuit, explaining its view
that filing a proof of claim in bankruptcy subjects the state to the full
amount of counterclaims arising from the same transaction or occurrence,
noted that this conclusion subjected the state to “a Hobson’s choice”:
If the state chooses to file a proof of claim with the court, it ex-
poses itself to liability arising from a compulsory counterclaim; if
it declines to file a proof of claim, it will be permanently barred
from collecting its debt or, for that matter, collecting a pro rata
share of the bankruptcy estate.143
But the court nonetheless adhered to its conclusion concerning waiver,
reasoning that “[e]ven the Eleventh Amendment . . . does not ensure a
state the choice of a desirable alternative.”144  Perhaps this conclusion can
be seen as particularly justifiable in the context of bankruptcy, where the
focus must be on providing one centralized adjudication of claims relating
to the debtor’s estate.145  But it is interesting to note that no similar imper-
immunity with respect to all compulsory counterclaims arising from those con-
tracts and conduct.”).
139. Compare Arecibo Cmty. Health Care, Inc. v. Puerto Rico, 270 F.3d 17, 28
(1st Cir. 2001) (concluding that “[11 U.S.C.] § 106(b) validly waives a state’s Elev-
enth Amendment immunity with respect to the full amount of any compulsory
counterclaims”), with In re Friendship Med. Ctr., Ltd., 710 F.2d 1297, 1300-01 (7th
Cir. 1983) (apparently reasoning in the alternative that waiver did not extend to
counterclaims in excess of the state’s claim). See generally Siegel, supra note 131, at
1225 n.316 (2003) (noting this apparent circuit split).
140. 541 U.S. 440 (2004).
141. 546 U.S. 356 (2006).
142. Id. at 378.
143. Arecibo Community Health Care, 270 F.3d at 29.
144. Id.
145. Cf. infra notes 148-149 and accompanying text (discussing in rem
jurisdiction).
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ative for centralized adjudication drove the Federal Circuit’s determina-
tion that a state’s patent suit subjects it to counterclaims arising from the
same transaction or occurrence—even though such a holding could be
seen to present the state with a similar Hobson’s choice, given that patent
claims fall within exclusive federal-court jurisdiction.146
Moving still further along the spectrum, Congress has subjected for-
eign nations suing in United States courts to somewhat broader liability on
counterclaims.  The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) provides
that
[i]n any action brought by a foreign state, or in which a foreign
state intervenes, in a court of the United States or of a State, the
foreign state shall not be accorded immunity with respect to any
counterclaim—
(a) for which a foreign state would not be entitled to immu-
nity under section 1605 or 1605A of this chapter had such claim
been brought in a separate action against the foreign state; or
(b) arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the
subject matter of the claim of the foreign state; or
(c) to the extent that the counterclaim does not seek relief
exceeding in amount or differing in kind from that sought by the
foreign state.147
The FSIA’s distinctive feature, for our purposes, is that it lists options (b)
and (c) in the disjunctive: a foreign state’s assertion of a claim waives the
nation’s immunity from liability on a counterclaim to the extent that the
counterclaim either arises out of the same transaction or occurrence or is
limited to the kind and amount of relief sought by the nation itself.148
Having reviewed the treatment of claims by the federal government
and by state and foreign governments, we can now turn to the treatment
of similar questions in cases involving claims by Native American nations.
An early case involving tribal sovereign immunity, United States v. United
States Fidelity & Guaranty Co.,149 indicates that tribes are treated the same
as the federal government with respect to counterclaims.  In United States
Fidelity & Guaranty, the United States had filed a claim on behalf of certain
Indian nations, and the Supreme Court held that the tribes’ sovereign im-
munity applied in such a context because “[i]t is as though the immunity
146. See 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (2006).
147. Id. § 1607.
148. As to the transactional waiver, the House Report explained: “Certainly, if
a foreign state brings or intervenes in an action based on a particular transaction
or occurrence, it should not obtain the benefits of litigation before U.S. courts
while avoiding any legal liabilities claimed against it and arising from that transac-
tion or occurrence.” H.R. REP. NO. 94-1487, at 17 (1976), reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604, 6622.  The House Report stated that the setoff provision “codi-
fies the rule enunciated in National Bank v. Republic of China, 348 U.S. 356 (1955).”
Id. at 18.
149. 309 U.S. 506 (1940).
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which was [the tribes’] as sovereigns passed to the United States for their
benefit.”150  The government had conceded that a counterclaim could val-
idly be used to diminish the government’s recovery on the tribes’ be-
half.151  But the Court roundly rejected the possibility that the waiver
extended further than that:
The desirability for complete settlement of all issues between par-
ties must, we think, yield to the principle of immunity.  The sov-
ereignty possessing immunity should not be compelled to defend
against cross-actions away from its own territory or in courts, not
of its own choice, merely because its debtor was unavailable ex-
cept outside the jurisdiction of the sovereign’s consent.  This rea-
soning is particularly applicable to Indian Nations with their
unusual governmental organization and peculiar problems.152
More recently, in Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold Reservation v.
Wold Engineering,153 the Court invalidated a state law under which a tribe
“could not avail itself of state court jurisdiction unless it consented to
waive its sovereign immunity and to have any civil disputes in state court to
which it is a party adjudicated under state law.”154  The Court framed its
analysis by stating that
not all conditions imposed on access to state courts which poten-
tially affect tribal immunity, and thus tribal self-government, are
objectionable.  For instance, even petitioner concedes that its tri-
bal immunity does not extend to protection from the normal
processes of the state court in which it has filed suit. . . .  Peti-
tioner also concedes that a non-Indian defendant may assert a
counterclaim arising out of the same transaction or occurrence
that is the subject of the principal suit as a setoff or
recoupment.155
The state law in question, however, was
unduly intrusive on the Tribe’s common law sovereign immunity,
and thus on its ability to govern itself according to its own laws.
By requiring that the Tribe open itself up to the coercive jurisdic-
tion of state courts for all matters occurring on the reservation,
the statute invites a potentially severe impairment of the author-
ity of the tribal government, its courts, and its laws.156
150. Id. at 512.
151. See id. at 511.
152. Id. at 513.
153. 476 U.S. 877 (1986).
154. Id. at 878.
155. Id. at 891.
156. Id.
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In Three Affiliated Tribes the Court avoided deciding “[t]he extent to
which respondent’s counterclaim may be used not only to defeat or re-
duce petitioner’s recovery, but also to fix the Tribe’s affirmative liabil-
ity.”157  But in Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian
Tribe of Oklahoma,158 the Supreme Court rejected the contention that a
tribe’s suit for injunctive relief against a state tax assessment waived immu-
nity from the state’s counterclaims for injunctive relief and $2.7 million in
back sales taxes.159  And a number of lower appellate court decisions sup-
port the view that a tribe’s assertion of a claim waives tribal sovereign im-
munity only to the extent that a counterclaim arises from the same
transaction or occurrence, seeks relief that is similar in kind to that sought
by the tribe, and operates defensively to reduce the defendant’s liability on
the tribe’s claim.160  The case law does include one nuance relating to in
rem jurisdiction: some cases indicate that if a government invokes the
court’s jurisdiction to determine the disposition of a res, then it may be
held to have waived its immunity from any resulting determination con-
cerning rights in that res.  This principle appears to apply similarly to both
the federal government161 and tribal governments.162
Construing a tribe’s waiver of immunity more narrowly than similar
waivers by states or foreign nations makes sense.  For one thing, the scope
of a foreign nation’s waiver as to counterclaims has been set by Congress;
and Congress has, generally speaking, enacted no similar statute with re-
spect to counterclaims against tribal plaintiffs.163  For another, Native
American tribes are situated very differently than either a state or a foreign
country.  Both states and foreign countries ordinarily can bring in their
157. Id. at 891 n.* (“We have no occasion to resolve this issue because the
case comes to us before trial and we do not know the extent of the counterclaim
asserted by respondent.”).
158. 498 U.S. 505 (1991).
159. See id. at 509-10.
160. See, e.g., Berrey v. Asarco Inc., 439 F.3d 636, 644-45 (10th Cir. 2006);
Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. A & P Steel, Inc., 874 F.2d 550, 552-53 (8th Cir. 1989).
161. Cf. The Siren, 74 U.S. 152, 154 (1868) (discussing government’s suit for
condemnation of ship and explaining that “when [the United States] proceed in
rem, they open to consideration all claims and equities in regard to the property
libelled”).
162. See United States v. Oregon, 657 F.2d 1009 (9th Cir. 1982) (treating lim-
ited fishing resources as res under federal court’s continuing equitable control,
and concluding that tribe’s intervention therefore constituted consent to entry of
decree enjoining it from fishing).
163. For an early example of one such statute, see Act of April 26, 1906, § 18,
34 Stat. 137, 144 (“Where suit is now pending, or may hereafter be filed in any
United States court in the Indian Territory, by or on behalf of any one or more of
the Five Civilized Tribes to recover moneys claimed to be due and owing to such
tribe, the party defendants to such suit shall have the right to set up and have
adjudicated any claim it may have against such tribe; and any balance that may be
found due by any tribe or tribes shall be paid by the Treasurer of the United States
out of any funds of such tribe or tribes upon the filing of the decree of the court
with him.”).
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own courts many of the claims that are most important to them.  By con-
trast, as discussed in Part III, current federal Indian law prevents tribes
from bringing many claims against nonmembers in tribal court.  A tribe’s
choice to bring suit in a non-tribal court, therefore, is often much less a
voluntary choice than an act of necessity.164  And given that the scope of
tribal sovereign immunity is broader in other respects than the scope of
foreign sovereign immunity,165 there is no incongruity in maintaining dif-
ferent frameworks for waiver of tribal sovereign immunity and waiver of
foreign sovereign immunity.
V. CONCLUSION
For Native American nations, sovereignty and litigation are closely
linked—perhaps most obviously, because it was through litigation that the
limits described in Part III of this Article were imposed on the tribes.  Part
II discussed another connection between sovereignty and litigation—
namely, a government’s interest in being able to sue in its own courts.  For
tribes, the limits summarized in Part III often impair this interest by bar-
ring a tribe from suing nonmembers in tribal court.  In Part IV, I observed
that when a tribe instead brings suit in a non-tribal court, that litigation
may affect the tribe’s sovereign interests in yet another way, by waiving the
tribe’s immunity from suit on possible counterclaims.  I have argued that,
in the light of the matters discussed in this Article, the scope of such a
waiver should be narrower for tribal plaintiffs than it is for state or foreign
government plaintiffs.
This is not to say that a tribe should leave a claimant without a forum
in which to obtain affirmative relief on a valid claim.  As I have argued
elsewhere, it is salutary for a tribe to waive immunity from suit in its own
courts in order to provide such a remedy.  Though tribal courts may be
foreclosed from hearing many claims by a tribe against nonmembers, they
can provide a suitable forum for hearing claims by nonmembers against
the tribe.
164. Cf. Seinfeld, supra note 125, at 912 (“The decision to forego immunity
from suit in order to gain a right of access to the federal courts (as a plaintiff,
claimant, or otherwise) can be classified as voluntary only if one concedes that the
cost of exclusion from the federal courts is not impossibly high.  If the cost of
exclusion were perceived as too high, then the choice to forego immunity would
be no choice at all; rather, it would be the only possible response to the threatened
sanction.”).
165. The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act sets a number of exceptions to
foreign sovereign immunity, including an exception for cases “in which the action
is based upon a commercial activity carried on in the United States by the foreign
state; or upon an act performed in the United States in connection with a commer-
cial activity of the foreign state elsewhere; or upon an act outside the territory of
the United States in connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state
elsewhere and that act causes a direct effect in the United States.”  28 U.S.C.
§ 1605(a)(2).  By contrast, there is no commercial-activities exception to tribal sov-
ereign immunity. See Kiowa Tribe of Okla. v. Mfg. Techs., Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 760
(1998).
